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World Bank data for 2008 shows that incomes in Norway are about 400 times more 
than those in Congo. Statistics cannot convey what journalist Kevin Carter did with 
a photo of a vulture waiting for a starving child to die; haunted by vivid memories 
of starving children, Kevin committed suicide three months later. At the same time, 
the rich buy $20,000 crocodile skin briefcases, and richest 250 people have more 
wealth than the bottom 2.5 billion.  How did the world come to be this way? Can we 
change things for the better? These questions, and the urge to ‘do something about 
it’ arise naturally to sensitive and compassionate people. 
 Prior to World War I, virtually the whole world was under direct or indirect 
control of European powers. Used as pawns on an international chessboard, the 
European colonies tasted  of wars and revolutions and freedom.  These lessons were 
put to use as nearly all colonies gained independence by the middle of the twentieth 
century. Leaders of the newly independent countries faced this question in its most 
urgent and practical form: what policies should we adopt to lift ourselves up from 
poverty? Long periods of colonization had destroyed indigenous traditions and 
leadership, and power came into the hands of western educated elites, who natural-
ly pursued western ideas about the nature of the problem of “under-development” 
and its cure. The striking fact about sixty years of experience with pursuing these 
strategies is their virtually complete failure. The main reason for this failure has 
been a deep rooted misunderstanding of the nature of the process of development. 
Economic theories equate growth with accumulation of capital (or wealth) and give 
human beings a secondary place in the process. The reality is that human beings are 
central to the process; as Mahbubul Haq1 realized after bitter experience, “Human 
beings are both the means and ends of development.” 
 In Pakistan, we have first hand experience of this failure. The first and sec-
ond Five Year Plans of Pakistan were drafted by economic experts from Harvard, 
who also created academic and bureaucratic institutions (PIDE, Planning Com-
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mission, CSO, etc.) required for this process. Mahbubul-Haq, one of the chief ar-
chitects and executors of the Harvard group economic policies, was disillusioned 
by the outcomes of the much touted “Decade of Development”. In 1968, after ten 
years of western style development, Dr Haq said that 22 family groups “controlled 
at that time about two thirds of the industrial assets, 80 percent of banking, and 70 
percent of insurance in Pakistan”.   He expressed his dissatisfaction as follows: “In 
blunt terms, Pakistan’s capitalistic system is still one of the most primitive in the 
world. It is a system in which economic feudalism prevails. A handful of people, 
whether landlords or industrialists or bureaucrats, make all the basic decisions.” 
 Post World War II, first generation policies for economic development de-
signed by expert economists led to similar outcomes throughout the world. Wide-
spread failures, and changing political climate, led to the development of second 
generation development policies, this time based on free markets. The IMF and 
the World Bank created the “Washington Consensus,” a list of ten universally ap-
plicable economic policies for growth. Despite substantial difference in appearance 
and format, this “new” approach to development has led to outcomes similar to 
those observed in Pakistan: Increases in concentration of wealth, income inequali-
ties, poverty and unemployment. Social tensions caused by these policies have fre-
quently resulted in political and economic crises. Some economists have argued 
that much of the poverty we see around the world is due to global imposition of 
these flawed policies for growth.
 In parallel with Mahbubul-Haq, many people associated with the design and 
execution of the Washington Consensus policies have acknowledged their failure. 
John Williamson, who coined the term “Washington Consensus,” has summarized 
the overall results as2 “disappointing, to say the least”.  Despite this acknowledged 
failure, Williamson, and other economists and policymakers continue to tout third 
generation reformed and sophisticated versions of these policies, as cures for low 
income. They attribute second generation failures to institutional weaknesses, flaws 
in execution and sequencing, corruption, and other factors.  In fact, these poli-
cies and their background theories are fundamentally flawed. To prove this, Dani 
Rodrik3 of Harvard has pointed out that the general economic policies of China 
and India remained the exact opposite to the Washington Consensus’ main recom-
mendations” “Stabilize, Liberalize and Privatize.” Both had high levels of protec-
tionism, no privatization, extensive industrial policies planning, and lax fiscal and 
financial policies through the 1990s. They have nonetheless been highly successful 
in achieving income growth and poverty reduction.
 From several different lines of research, it appears that economists have 
focused on the wrong areas in their search for the engines of growth. Instead of 
building machines, and exploiting laborers to provide capital for investments, the 
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best investment is the people themselves. Research shows that the wealth of nations 
is embodied in human beings, rather than in industries and infrastructure. Intan-
gibles of trust, cooperation, and forging national consensus are keys to progress; 
unfortunately, these lie outside the ambit of traditional economic theories. Pioneers 
like Amartya Sen with his “Development and Freedom” and the Human Develop-
ment approach of Mahbubul Haq have broken fresh ground. Instead of following 
rehashes of failed policies, policy makers urgently need to adopt these new ways of 
thinking.  
Notes:
1. This and subsequent details about Mahbubul Haq are taken from “From Econom-
ic Growth to Human Development: The Journey with Mahbubul Haq,” by Faisal 
Bari, to appear in Lahore Journal of Economics. Draft of this article available from 
sites.google.com/site/aznews0. 
2. John Williamson, “Did the Washington Consensus Fail?” speech at Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, Nov. 6, 2002. available from: 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=488
3. Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion: 
A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s:Learning from a 
Decade of Reform” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 44, 2006.
108
